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Abstract
The detection of deception has attracted increased attention among psychological researchers, legal scholars, and ethicists
during the last decade. Much of this has been driven by the possibility of using neuroimaging techniques for lie detection.
Yet, neuroimaging studies addressing deception detection are clouded by lack of conceptual clarity and a host of
methodological problems that are not unique to neuroimaging. We review the various research paradigms and the
dependent measures that have been adopted to study deception and its detection. In doing so, we differentiate between
basic research designed to shed light on the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying deceptive behavior and applied
research aimed at detecting lies. We also stress the distinction between paradigms attempting to detect deception directly
and those attempting to establish involvement by detecting crime-related knowledge, and discuss the methodological
difficulties and threats to validity associated with each paradigm. Our conclusion is that the main challenge of future
research is to find paradigms that can isolate cognitive factors associated with deception, rather than the discovery of a
unique (brain) correlate of lying. We argue that the Comparison Question Test currently applied in many countries has
weak scientific validity, which cannot be remedied by using neuroimaging measures. Other paradigms are promising, but
the absence of data from ecologically valid studies poses a challenge for legal admissibility of their outcomes.
Descriptors: Detection of deception, Neuroimaging, Validity, Concealed Information Test, Comparison Question Test,
Differentiation of deception
Attempts to use psychophysiological measures to detect deception
can be traced back to over a hundred years ago (e.g., Munsterberg,
1908; see Lykken, 1998, for an historical overview). Most notably,
this early work led to the development of detection methods based
on simultaneous recording of multiple physiological measures such
as heart rate, blood pressure, and electrodermal activity, and this
gave rise to the term polygraph (Grubin & Madsen, 2005). The way
the polygraph is employed to infer deception has, however, been
criticized by a number of academic scholars throughout the years. In
fact, in its 2003 report, the National Research Council (NRC) noted
the field has made little progress over the last decades (National
Research Council, 2003; see also Meijer & Verschuere, 2015).
Fuelled by the September 11 terror attack in the United States
and subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, interest
in the detection of deception has gained momentum in the past
years. This development coincided with the increased accessibility
of modern neuroimaging techniques such as positron emission
tomography (PET) or functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), and a growing number of neuroscientists have begun to
explore whether measurements of brain functions can help to detect
deception (Gamer, 2014; Ganis, 2014; see Figure 1). Moreover,
private companies such as Government Works, No Lie MRI, and
Truthful Brain Corporation are marketing lie detection tests based
on brain function. For example, the No Lie MRI website states that
“No Lie MRI Inc. provides unbiased methods for the detection of
deception . . .” and that this technology “represents the first and
only direct measure of truth verification and lie detection in human
history” (www.noliemri.com). The scientific community closely
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monitored these developments, and a number of articles discussing
the legal and ethical implications of detection of deception based
on neuroimaging have been published in various outlets, including
flagship journals such as Nature Neuroscience and Science (e.g.,
Editorial, 2008; Farah, Hutchinson, Phelps, & Wagner, 2014;
Miller, 2010).
Many of the articles that address the application of neuroimag-
ing to deception detection contrast fMRI with the traditional poly-
graph tests, and suggest that measuring brain activation can help to
overcome the shortcomings of the latter (e.g., Bles & Haynes,
2008; Kozel et al., 2004; Langleben et al., 2005). Farah and col-
leagues (2014), for example, write that “the appeal of this brain-
based lie detection approach is that, in contrast to most previous
methods—which detected the emotional arousal resulting from
deception—it measures physiological changes associated with cog-
nitive processes during deception and could therefore, in principle,
shed light on the process of deception itself” (p. 123). The idea of
neuroimaging providing privileged access to the deceptive brain is
intuitively appealing. Yet, it ignores one important point: Detecting
deceptive behavior always critically depends on a questioning/
interrogation paradigm that elicits deceptive behavior. Thus, while
in principle neuroimaging research can yield important information
about deceptive behavior, it is impossible to evaluate the validity
of this research while ignoring the paradigm used for this purpose.
Choosing an appropriate paradigm is important because, in con-
trast to what is assumed in many articles discussing the neuroimag-
ing of deception, measures cannot be equated with psychological
constructs such as deception; a given measure may tap into very
different states, depending upon the paradigm in which it is admin-
istered. Skin conductance, for example, can index emotional
arousal when used in conjunction with a picture-viewing paradigm
(Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993), but also attentional
orienting when combined with a habituation paradigm (Frith &
Allen, 1983). Thus, the paradigm determines the psychological
state that any dependent measure reflects. For example, as we will
discuss in detail below, the shortcomings of traditional polygraph
tests are not related to the reliability and validity of the autonomic
nervous system (ANS) measures (e.g., electrodermal activity) on
which they rely, but are rather related to weaknesses of the para-
digm employed; most paradigms fail at isolating deception because
they rely on improper control questions or stimuli. Many recent
publications on the merits of neuroimaging for deception detection
purposes overlook this point and fail to make proper distinctions
between the various paradigms implemented to study deception
and the dependent variables used to tap into deceptive behavior.
The distinction between paradigms and dependent measures is
important for three reasons. First, the paradigms differ in their dem-
onstrated validity, and each paradigm may be vulnerable to differ-
ent threats to validity. Second, paradigms vary greatly in what they
aim to measure, with some targeting mechanisms involved in
deceptive behavior (e.g., executive functioning), while others aim
to detect recognition of crime-related knowledge. Third, paradigms
and dependent variables may interact such that the validity of the
physiological measures may depend on the paradigm used.
In this article, we will stress that the vast majority of neuroi-
maging literature dealing with deception detection is hampered by
a lack of conceptual clarity and a host of methodological problems,
primarily because it disregards the distinction between the depend-
ent variable and the paradigm. Clearly, these problems are not
unique to the neuroimaging literature, but relate more broadly to
the literature on deception and its detection. Below, we will first
describe the most frequently used paradigms employed in decep-
tion research. Next, we evaluate the assumptions and theories
underlying these paradigms, evaluate their validity, and attempt to
clarify the distinctions between research designed to shed light on
the psychological mechanisms underlying deceptive behavior and
research designed to validate techniques that can be applied for the
detection of deception. Finally, we discuss the implications for
basic and applied research, as well as the legal implications. We
have no ambition to provide an exhaustive review of the available
literature on the detection of deception with the ANS, ERPs, or
neuroimaging-based measures. Such resources are readily available
(see, e.g., National Research Council, 2003, and Meijer & Ver-
schuere, 2015, for a discussion of polygraph testing and Gamer,
2014, and Ganis, 2014, for a discussion of neuroimaging-based lie
detection). Nor are we aiming to provide elaborate directions for
future research. The aim of this paper is to inform readers about the
importance of the paradigm in deception research, and we hope
that it will serve to guide more in-depth discussions on the scien-
tific status, legal admissibility, and ethical issues surrounding the
detection of deception.
Paradigms and Dependent Measures
Used to Study Deception
Many deception studies have used ANS measures such as electro-
dermal activity, respiration, heart rate, and blood pressure. More
recently, measures directly related to central nervous system activ-
ity, such as fMRI and ERPs, have been introduced (e.g., Farwell &
Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld, Angell, Johnson, & Qian, 1991; Rose-
nfeld et al., 1988; Spence et al., 2001). A number of studies have
also measured behavioral responses such as reaction times (e.g.,
Seymour, Seifert, Mosmann, & Shafto, 2000). Studies employing
these psychophysiological and behavioral measures typically
employ more or less controlled paradigms, in which questions and/
or stimuli are presented, often in a large number of trials.
Although a variety of paradigms have been adopted to study
deception and its detection, the bulk of the research can be classi-
fied as relying on one of three paradigms. These paradigms, along
with the dependent measures used in conjunction with them, are
displayed in Table11. They include the Comparison Question Test
Figure 1. Number of relevant publications about fMRI and lie detection
per year, resulting from a Web of Science search using the following
terms in the topic field: TS5(“lie detection” OR deception) AND
TS5(fMRI OR “functional magnetic resonance”). Results include
empirical and review papers, but also papers dealing with ethical and
legal evaluations.
1. We focus on the paradigms that have been most frequently used in
deception and detection of deception research. Other paradigms have
been applied by only a limited number of researchers, such as the auto-
biographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Fer-
rara, & Castiello, 2008), and the rapid serial visual presentation task
(Ganis & Patnaik, 2009). As the number of studies using these other
paradigms is relatively small, we will not discuss them. We will also
not discuss variations within each of the three paradigms.
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(CQT),2 designed to detect deception by formulating direct (“Did
you do it?”) relevant questions. The responses to relevant questions
are compared with responses to comparison questions. The latter
type of questions is focused on general, nonspecific transgressions
of a nature as similar as possible to the issue under investigation
(e.g., “Have you ever taken something that did not belong to
you?”). To increase the relevance of the comparison questions to
the innocent examinee, they are typically introduced with a cover
story, for example, that admitting any wrongdoing will negatively
affect the credibility of the suspect (Offe & Offe, 2007). The CQT
paradigm is typically employed in combination with ANS meas-
ures (Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, 2014; Reid & Inbau, 1977), and is
widely used by law enforcement agencies around the world (Meijer
& van Koppen, 2008; Raskin & Honts, 2002).
The second paradigm was initially labeled the Guilty Knowl-
edge Test (GKT, see Lykken, 1959, 1960), but is nowadays com-
monly referred to as the Concealed Information Test (CIT, see
Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011). This paradigm is not a
deception test per se, but rather a procedure designed to detect
whether an examinee possesses pertinent information. When the
test shows that an examinee has knowledge of crime-related details
such as the weapon used in a murder, involvement in the crime
may be inferred. In the CIT, questions presented to the examinee
are followed by one relevant alternative (e.g., a feature of the crime
under investigation) and several neutral (control) alternatives ran-
domly ordered. These neutral alternatives are chosen such that an
innocent suspect would not be able to discriminate them from the
relevant alternative. In contrast, a suspect who is familiar with the
details of the crime would be able to discriminate between the rele-
vant and the neutral control items.
The CIT has been studied extensively with a variety of depend-
ent measures, including ANS measures (see Gamer, 2011, for a
review), ERP measures (see Rosenfeld, 2011, for a review), and
reaction times (see Verschuere & de Houwer, 2011, for a review).
Several CIT studies using fMRI as the dependent measure have
also been published (e.g., Bhatt et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2013; Ding
et al., 2012; Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2007; Gamer,
Klimecki, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2012; Langleben et al.,
2002, 2005; Nose, Murai, & Taira, 2009; Peth et al., 2015;
Suchotzki, Verschuere, Peth, Crombez, & Gamer, 2015). Applica-
tion of the CIT by law enforcement agencies is limited, except for
Japan where the CIT—with ANS measures—is the standard para-
digm used by the National Police in criminal investigations (for a
description of CIT practices in Japan, see Osugi, 2011, and for a
comparison of the [Western] laboratory use of the CIT vs. the
Japanese field application, see Ogawa, Matsuda, Tsuneoka, & Ver-
schuere, 2015).
The third paradigm described in Table 1 is the differentiation of
deception (DoD) paradigm. The DoD paradigm was originally
developed by Furedy and his colleagues (e.g., Furedy, Davis, &
Gurevich, 1988) to study deception by isolating the deceptive
response and controlling for other confounding factors. Typically,
in the DoD paradigm, examinees are presented with a series of
(autobiographical) questions and are instructed to give truthful
answers to half of them and deceptive answers to the other half. In
a more recent variant of the DoD paradigm, labeled the Sheffield
Lie Test (e.g., Spence et al., 2001), participants are typically asked
to answer each question twice: once truthfully and once decep-
tively. Initial research using the DoD paradigm relied mainly on
ANS measures (e.g., Furedy et al., 1988; G€odert, Rill, & Vossel,
2001; Vincent & Furedy, 1992; see also Bradley, MacLaren, &
Black, 1996). More recently, the DoD paradigm has been widely
adopted to study deception with fMRI (e.g., Kozel et al., 2004;
Spence et al., 2001), and reaction times (Hu, Chen, & Fu, 2012;
Van Bockstaele et al., 2012; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar,
2011) as the dependent measures. A number of studies used the
DoD paradigm with ERPs (e.g., Hu, Wu, & Fu, 2011; Johnson,
Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2005; Suchotzki, Crombez, Smulders, Meijer,
& Verschuere, 2015; Tu et al., 2009). The limited number of legal
cases in which fMRI was employed all relied on a variant of the
DoD paradigm (Miller, 2010; Spence, Kaylor-Hughes, Farrow, &
Wilkinson, 2008).
Assumptions and Theory Underlying the Paradigms
CQT
The CQT is based on the assumption that deceptive examinees will
perceive the relevant questions as more threatening than the com-
parison questions, and that relevant questions will therefore elicit
larger ANS responses. Truthful examinees, on the other hand, are
expected to perceive the comparison questions as more threatening
than the relevant questions (Elaad, 2003; MacNeill, Bradley,
Cullen, & Arsenault, 2014). Thus, larger responses to the relevant
than to the comparison questions are seen as a red flag of decep-
tion, while the reverse pattern (larger responses to the comparison
than to the relevant questions) is thought to reflect truth telling.
The relevant and comparison questions, however, differ on many
dimensions, such as significance, ambiguity, and emotional
valence. Both guilty and innocent suspects may easily perceive the
differences between the relevant questions specifically related to
the issue under investigation and the more broadly framed compari-
son questions. Importantly, because the ANS parameters monitored
during the typical CQT are known to be affected by these other fac-
tors, stronger responses to relevant than to comparison items cannot
be solely attributed to deception (e.g., National Research Council,
2003). The CQT has also been criticized because the formulation
Table 1. Paradigms and Physiological Measures Used in Studies of Deception and its Detection
Paradigm Contrast Usage in field Measures
CQT Relevant vs. comparison questions Extensive worldwide ANS
CIT Correct vs. incorrect details Limited except for Japan ANS, ERP, RT, fMRI
DoD Deceptive vs. truthful responses Not used ANS, ERP, RT, fMRI
Note. CQT5Comparison Question Test; CIT5Concealed Information Test; DoD5 differentiation of deception; ANS5 autonomic nervous system;
RT5 reaction times; ERP5 event-related brain potential; fMRI5 functional magnetic resonance imaging.
2. Before the CQT was developed, the relevant/irrelevant (R/I) para-
digm was employed as an aid to forensic investigations in the early
period of polygraph practice (see Reid, 1947). But nowadays, its
obvious weaknesses have been widely recognized (Horowitz, Kircher,
Honts, & Raskin, 1997), and it is no longer used for this purpose. Fur-
thermore, insufficient research on the R/I paradigm is available and,
consequently, it will not be discussed in this paper.
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and presentation of the CQT questions are unstandardized, and
because the test is typically conducted in a contaminated manner,
that is, by examiners who have a priori knowledge of the case that
might bias their interpretation of the subsequent test results (for a
general analysis of such observer effects, see Risinger, Saks,
Thompson, & Rosenthal, 2002). Thus, it is impossible to determine
whether test outcomes actually reflect differential physiological
responding to relevant and comparison questions, or prior informa-
tion available to the examiner (Ben-Shakhar, Bar-Hillel, & Lie-
blich, 1986).
Several theoretical frameworks have been formulated to explain
differential responding in the CQT (e.g., conflict theory or the con-
ditioned response theory), but none of these accounts is convinc-
ingly supported by the data (National Research Council, 2003). For
these reasons, the CQT has continuously been criticized and is con-
sidered by most researchers as lacking scientific foundation (e.g.,
Ben-Shakhar, 2002; Iacono & Lykken, 2002; Lykken, 1974;
National Research Council, 2003).
CIT
As indicated above, the CIT is not a test of deception, but can
detect only knowledge of crime-related information. The main
assumption underlying this test is that for a knowledgeable suspect
the relevant alternatives are significant and consequently elicit dif-
ferential physiological and behavioral responses in comparison to
neutral alternatives, whereas an innocent suspect is unable to distin-
guish between the relevant and the neutral alternatives. When criti-
cal and neutral alternatives are, indeed, indistinguishable to an
innocent suspect, the CIT possesses an optimal control condition,
and differential responding can be attributed only to knowledge of
crime details. In addition, because innocent suspects cannot dis-
criminate between the relevant and the neutral items, their relative
responses to the relevant items cannot be affected by factors such
as stress and motivation to avoid detection.
As the autonomic nervous system fluctuations used in the CIT
are components of the orienting response (OR, see Lynn, 1966;
Sokolov, 1963), it is not surprising that orienting theory has been
proposed as a framework to understand the differential responding
in the CIT. Germane to this, Sokolov (1963) and his followers
noted that significant stimuli (“signal-value stimuli,” to use Soko-
lov’s terminology) elicit enhanced Ors, and this can account for the
enhanced responses to the crime-relevant stimuli observed among
knowledgeable (guilty) individuals. The relationship between the
CIT effect and the OR was highlighted by Lykken (1974) who
wrote that, “. . . for the guilty subject only, the ‘correct’ alternative
will have a special significance, an added ‘signal value’ which will
tend to produce a stronger orienting reflex than that subject will
show to other alternatives” (p. 728).
There is ample evidence supporting the OR account for CIT
outcomes. For example, the physiological response pattern elicited
by the relevant CIT items in knowledgeable individuals (e.g.,
increased skin conductance response, Lykken, 1959; heart rate
deceleration, Verschuere, Crombez, De Clercq, & Koster, 2004;
respiratory suppression, Timm, 1982; and increased pupil dilation,
Lubow & Fein, 1996) is typical for the OR. Furthermore, several
features characteristic of the OR have been demonstrated using the
CIT paradigm. A case in point is response habituation, which has
been observed in several CIT studies (e.g., Balloun & Holmes,
1979; Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmass, 1975; Gamer, Ver-
schuere, Crombez, & Vossel, 2008; Verschuere, Crombez, De
Clercq, & Koster, 2005). Related to this, and as predicted by OR
theory, differential responding has been demonstrated to increase
when pertinent items are less frequently presented (e.g., Ben-
Shakhar, 1977).
The CIT has also been used effectively with the P300 compo-
nent of the ERPs (e.g., Meijer, klein Selle, Elber, & Ben-Shakhar,
2014; Rosenfeld, 2011). While the question of whether the P300 is
an OR measure has been debated in the literature (Donchin et al.,
1984), it is definitely affected by stimulus qualities that elicit ORs,
notably stimulus novelty and significance (e.g., Donchin, 1981).
Both P300 and ANS measures seem to reflect attentional processes
related to the mobilization for action following motivationally sig-
nificant stimuli (Nieuwenhuis, de Geus, & Aston-Jones, 2011).
Besides orienting, response inhibition (i.e., suppression of dom-
inant responses) can partially explain the differential responding in
the CIT (Verschuere & Ben-Shakhar, 2011). Data supporting the
idea that a combination of orienting and inhibition underlies the
responses observed in the CIT comes from fMRI studies. Gamer
(2014) recently argued that the pattern of brain activation in CIT
studies primarily reflects the engagement of cognitive mechanisms
that are associated with (a) attentional orienting toward relevant
alternatives, (b) response inhibition (withholding the prepotent
truth response), and (c) selection and planning of the deceptive
behavioral response. Importantly, the notion that apart from the OR
inhibition plays a role fits with both ANS results and P300 results,
as the amplitude of the latter has also been shown to be sensitive to
inhibition (Polich, 2007). Two recent studies (klein Selle, Ver-
schuere, Kindt, Meijer, & Ben-Shakhar, 2015; Suchotzki, Ver-
schuere et al., 2015) disentangled the role of orienting and response
inhibition in the CIT, and showed that skin conductance responding
could best be explained by orienting theory, while reaction time,
heart rate, respiration, and fMRI responses are affected by response
inhibition.
In sum, the CIT is a valid paradigm for detecting concealed
knowledge. However, for studying deception, the CIT is con-
founded by a frequency effect. That is, with each question, only
one relevant alternative that potentially elicits deceptive behavioral
responses is presented, while multiple neutral alternatives—associ-
ated with a truthful behavioral response—are presented. An addi-
tional confound when trying to isolate deception is that for
knowledgeable examinees the relevant alternative has been previ-
ously encoded in memory, while the neutral alternatives have not.
For these two reasons, the CIT is ill-suited for studying mecha-
nisms underlying deception per se.
DoD
The DoD paradigm was designed to examine deception while con-
trolling for all other potentially confounding factors. Because
deceptive and truthful responses are elicited equally often, it is not
confounded by frequency. In addition, implementations of the DoD
paradigm (e.g., Spence et al., 2001) required subjects to respond
both deceptively and truthfully to each question (i.e., on a within-
subject basis), thereby effectively controlling for the level of signif-
icance. Because of this control, any difference in responding
between the questions can be attributed solely to deception.
Theoretical accounts that have been offered for the effects
found in the DoD paradigm are primarily based on fMRI data, and
show that deceptive responses are associated with increased cogni-
tive effort, particularly response inhibition. As noted by Gamer
(2014), results of the various studies in this domain yield an activa-
tion pattern scattered across the brain, showing that deception is
not related to a unique brain region. As is true for the CIT,
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activated regions have been linked in previous studies to a number
of cognitive mechanisms including response monitoring, cognitive
control, response inhibition, and memory. Moreover, the reaction
time slowing associated with deceptive responses is consistent with
cognitive control (Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, (2012) and
inhibition (Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De Schryner, & Ver-
schuere, 2015; but see Verschuere, Schuhmann, & Sack, 2012),
playing an important role in the DoD paradigm.
Our discussion of the various paradigms leads us to conclude
that, from a forensic application perspective, only the CIT has the
demonstrated potential of a scientifically based method. However,
the CIT is not suited to shed light on the neurocognitive factors
underlying deceptive behavior, and the DoD has the best methodo-
logical rigor for enhancing our theoretical understanding of
deception.
Accuracy
One of the most important questions—especially from an applied
perspective—is “to what extent can a specific paradigm combined
with a specific dependent measure differentiate between deceptive
and truthful participants?” Accuracy can be expressed in several
ways. Many studies report their results in terms of correct detection
rates of deceptive (sensitivity) and nondeceptive (specificity)
examinees. But because the meaning of the proportion of correctly
identified persons depends on the specific cutoff point on the detec-
tion measure that was employed in a particular study, this parame-
ter is not very useful for evaluating criterion validity and defies
comparisons of detection rates across different studies. One way of
dealing with this problem is by using signal detection measures.
Indeed, a signal detection approach was recommended by the NRC
report (National Research Council, 2003) and adopted by many
researchers (e.g., Ben-Shakhar, 1977; Ben-Shakhar & Gati, 1987;
Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmass, 1970; Gamer et al., 2008;
Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Rayan, 2004).
The signal detection approach provides measures of detection
efficiency that do not depend on a single, arbitrary, cutoff point.
Rather, statistics are calculated by comparing the entire distribu-
tions of the detection scores of guilty (or deceptive) and innocent
(or truthful) participants. Based on these distributions, a receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve can be generated and the area
under this ROC curve (a) represents the detection efficiency
regardless of any specific cutoff point (for a detailed description of
generating ROC curves in CIT experiments, see Lieblich, Kugel-
mass, & Ben-Shakhar, 1970). The area under the ROC curve
ranges between 0 and 1, such that an area of 0.5 means that the two
distributions (i.e., the detection score’s distributions for guilty and
innocent examinees) are indistinguishable (i.e., detecting whether
an examinee is deceptive or not will be at chance level). An area of
1 means that there is no overlap between the two distributions and
thus a perfect classification is possible. To allow for comparisons
between paradigms and dependent measures, we report the a statis-
tic.3 For studies reporting only sensitivity and specificity, we trans-
formed these values to a using the formula proposed by Grier
(1971).
CQT
For the CQT in combination with ANS measures, the best estimate
of the criterion validity can be derived from the 2003 report by the
NRC (National Research Council, 2003). The Council evaluated
37 laboratory CQT studies and found a median a value of .85.
Accordingly, it concluded that “in populations of examinees such
as those represented in the polygraph research literature . . .
specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truth
telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection”
(p. 4). The NRC did, however, also point out that, for the bulk of
the CQT research, it is questionable whether its results translate to
a real-life situation, a point to which we will return. As the CQT
has been exclusively combined with ANS measures, no data are
available for any other dependent measure.
CIT
The accuracy of the CIT has been extensively studied in laboratory
experiments, with a variety of measures. A recent meta-analysis
(Meijer et al., 2014) reported accuracy estimates for three ANS
measures (skin conductance response, respiration line length, and
heart rate), as well as for the P300 ERP measure. Average a’s were
.85, .77, .74, and .88, respectively. Importantly, accuracy of the
P300 was similar to that of skin conductance in the forensically rel-
evant mock crime paradigm.
To estimate the criterion validity of the CIT with reaction times,
we rely on a total of nine studies that included a group of partici-
pants knowledgeable of crime details and a group of unknowledge-
able participants, and reported data from which a could be derived
(Hu, Evans, Wu, Lee, & Fu, 2013; Kleinberg & Verschuere, 2015;
Noordraven & Verschuere, 2013; Rosenfeld et al., 2004; Sai, Zhou,
Ding, Fu, & Sang, 2014; Verschuere & Kleinberg, 2015; Ver-
schuere, Kleinberg, & Theocharidou, 2015; Visu-Petra, Miclea, &
Visu-Petra, 2012; Visu-Petra, Varga, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2013).
Taken together, these nine studies reveal a weighted average a
of .82
Finally, only four studies assessed the criterion validity of the
fMRI-based CIT, using both crime-knowledgeable and unknowl-
edgeable participants (Cui et al., 2013; Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner,
Kievit, & Schendan, 2011; Nose et al., 2009; Peth et al., 2015).
Collectively, these studies yield a weighted average a value of .94.
The a values for the different dependent measures in the CIT are
given in Table 2.
DoD
Furedy and his colleagues (Furedy et al., 1988; Furedy, Gigliotti, &
Ben-Shakhar, 1994; Furedy, Posner, & Vincent, 1991; Vincent &
Furedy. 1992) were the first to demonstrate that deceptive answers
elicited enhanced skin conductance responses in a DoD paradigm
(see also G€odert et al., 2001). As explained above, in the DoD para-
digm, deception and truth telling are manipulated within subjects.
As a result, these studies do not report sensitivity and specificity
and therefore do not allow for calculating the a statistic. Similarly,
neither reaction time nor ERP studies are available that compare
deceptive with truthful participants. Several studies investigated
the criterion validity of the DoD using fMRI as the dependent mea-
sure, but due to the within-subject comparison, most studies report
only sensitivity. Only one study reported both sensitivity and speci-
ficity allowing for a derivation of a. Kozel et al. (2009) found 93%
sensitivity and 38% specificity, corresponding to an a of .79.
In sum, only for the CIT paradigm are reasonably sufficient
data available to allow for a comparison between the various
dependent measures. This comparison shows that accuracy does
not differ much between measures (see also Verschuere, Crombez,3. This a measure is also referred to as the AUC.
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Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2010). Two important considerations should
be noted here. First, the estimate of the a value for ANS measures
in Table 2 relies only on the SCR measure. Given that combining
several ANS measures has been shown to increase accuracy
(Gamer et al., 2008), this estimate of a should be treated as the
lower bound accuracy estimate of ANS measures in the CIT. Sec-
ond, it should be noted here that the accuracy estimate of the
fMRI-based CIT seems slightly higher compared to the other
measures but it is based on relatively few participants, and none
of the four studies performed a cross validation on an independent
sample, meaning that the accuracy estimate might be an
overestimation.
Reverse Inference and Countermeasures
The assumptions and theories underlying the different paradigms
described earlier make clear that none of them assesses deception
directly. In the CQT, deception is inferred from emotional arousal,
in the DoD from cognitive control and inhibition, while in the CIT
recognition of crime-relevant information is inferred from an
enhanced orienting response, potentially combined with response
inhibition. The problems associated with such inferences have been
discussed extensively in the fMRI literature as the fallacy of the
reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006; Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, &
Frith, 2007). That is, even if deceptive responses are differentially
associated with brain activation in areas associated with cognitive
control, we cannot conclude that differential activation in these
areas necessarily implies that the subject is deceptive (i.e.,
responses to questions may be associated with enhanced cognitive
control even when they are truthful). Similarly, the fallacy of
reverse inference applies to the absence of differential activation: a
lack of activation in areas associated with inhibition does not nec-
essarily imply that the subject is responding truthfully.
Of course, the fallacy of the reverse inference problem is not
unique to brain imaging studies, and other dependent measures
(e.g., skin conductance or heart rate measures) are similarly vulner-
able to it. In fact, logically this fallacy is at the core of the short-
coming of the CQT: deception may be associated with emotional
arousal, but this does not mean that the presence of emotional
arousal necessarily indicates the subject is deceptive.
The reverse inference fallacy is closely related to another threat,
namely, that of countermeasures. The theoretical account of the
CIT, for example, implies that neither ANS measures nor the P300
are necessarily direct indicators of the presence of a memory trace
(Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013). They reflect stimulus significance and/
or deviance, and only under the assumption that all alternatives are
equally plausible can the presence of a memory trace be inferred.
As a consequence, both the P300 and the ANS-based CIT are sus-
ceptible to countermeasures (for a review, see Ben-Shakhar, 2011).
For example, Rosenfeld and his colleagues showed that any of the
irrelevant items in a CIT can be made significant by giving simple
instructions such as “wiggle your toe upon presentation of this
stimulus.” As a result, irrelevant items become significant and the
P300 amplitude elicited by these items increases, thereby reducing
diagnostic accuracy (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). A more recent P300-
based CIT protocol (the complex trial protocol; Rosenfeld et al.,
2008) has been shown to be resistant to these specific types of
countermeasures (see also Meixner & Rosenfeld, 2010; Rosenfeld
& Labkovsky, 2010). Yet, recent research has shown that simple
memory suppression instructions reduced the P300 to mock crime
information in this protocol (Hu, Bergstrom, Bodenhausen, &
Rosenfeld, 2015, but see Rosenfeld Ward, Drapekin, Labkovsky &
Tullman, 2015). Importantly, Ganis et al. (2011) demonstrated that
comparable countermeasures also worked in an fMRI setting and
reduced CIT detection accuracy from 100% to only 33%. This
illustrates nicely that the reverse inference problem discussed ear-
lier applies to the fMRI-based CIT as well.
From the Lab to the Field
In the section about accuracy, we noted that the NRC pointed out
that it is questionable whether the results reported in the bulk of the
CQT research would translate into real-life situations. Data show-
ing that when the CQT is used in mock crime research with partici-
pants (typically college students) who have nothing to lose, the
comparison questions are indeed perceived as more threatening
than the relevant questions (e.g., MacNeill et al., 2014) by no
means imply that this would also be the case for real suspects.
To determine the accuracy in the field, properly executed field
studies are necessary. An inherent problem to field studies, how-
ever, is selection bias (Begg & Greenes, 1983; Iacono, 1991; Pat-
rick & Iacono, 1991). This selection bias occurs because the
limited number of field studies on both the ANS-based CQT (e.g.,
National Research Council, 2003), and ANS-based CIT (Elaad,
1990; Elaad, Ginton, & Jungman, 1992) have relied on confessions
made by suspects at a later point in time as a ground truth criterion.
However, in many cases, such confessions are intimately related to
the outcomes of the deception test. That is, a confession is typically
obtained only in interrogations that follow positive (i.e., deception-
indicated) test outcomes. Thus, the basic requirement of an inde-
pendent criterion of ground truth is not met in this research area,
and, as a consequence, the accuracy estimates generated by these
studies might be inflated. A case in point here is Iacono (1991),
who showed that when using confessions elicited after a failed test
as a measure of ground truth, even a chance level accurate
Table 2. Overview of the Detection Accuracy of the Different
Measures in the CIT
Measure n a
SCR
Meta-analysis by Meijer et al. (2014) 3,863 .85
RT
Hu et al. (2013) 63 .91
Kleinberg & Verschuere (2015) Study 1 202 .78
Kleinberg & Verschuere (2015) Study 2 212 .80
Noordraven & Verschuere (2013) 42 .87
Verschuere et al. (2015) Study 2, single probe condition 116 .69
Verschuere et al. (2015) Study 2, multiple probe condition 94 .86
Verschuere & Kleinberg (2015) 73 .98
Visu-Petra et al. (2012) 40 .92
Visu-Petra et al. (2013) 73 .86
Rosenfeld et al. (2004) 22 .93
Sai et al. (2014) 44 .73
Total n/weighted a 981 .82
ERP
Meta-analysis by Meijer et al. (2014) 646 .88
fMRI
Cui et al. (2014) 32 .88
Ganis et al. (2011) 24 1
Nose et al. (2009) 38 .90
Peth et al. (2015) 40 .98
Total n/weighted a 134 .94
Note. Numbers in bold denote the total n and the weighted a. n5 total
number of participants; a5 area under the ROC curve; SCR5 skin con-
ductance response; RT5 reaction times; ERP5 event-related brain
potentials; fMRI5 functional magnetic resonance imaging.
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procedure yields near perfect accuracy (see also Iacono & Lykken,
2002). In addition, the contaminated administration of the CQT in
the field confounds the outcomes of this test with prior information
available to the investigators (Ben-Shakhar et al., 1986). In sum—
despite the extensive field use of the CQT worldwide, and the CIT
in Japan—no solid field studies exist, while for the DoD paradigm,
no field studies have been conducted for any of the dependent
measures.
For the CIT, external validity is also a concern. Importantly, the
CIT rests on the assumption that (a) individuals committing a crime
will remember several critical details, and (b) these details are
unknown to innocent suspects. These assumptions can be easily
checked in laboratory experiments, but in real life, where crimes
are often committed under great stress and time constraints, it may
be less straightforward to determine whether the perpetrator
actually perceived and encoded all crime-related items. Also, as the
test usually takes place weeks and sometimes months or even years
after the crime, it is doubtful whether all crime-related items will
be remembered during the test. Indeed, several recent laboratory
studies using ANS measures revealed that, when the CIT is admin-
istered 1 or 2 weeks after the mock crime, certain critical items are
not recalled and fail to elicit differential responses (Carmel, Dayan,
Naveh, Raveh, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003; Gamer, Kosiol, & Vossel,
2010; Nahari & Ben-Shakhar, 2011; Peth, Vossel, & Gamer,
2012). Needless to say, the problem of false negatives caused by
presenting critical details that are not remembered by the suspect
will not be resolved by changing from ANS to P300 or fMRI
measures.
The CIT also requires that none of the critical items have been
leaked either through the media or during the investigation. Several
studies, most of which were conducted by Bradley and his col-
leagues, demonstrated how information leakage may compromise
the outcomes of the CIT (see Bradley, Barefoot, & Arsenault,
2011, for a review). False positive errors caused by information
leakage equally apply to the P300 (Winograd & Rosenfeld, 2014),
and there is no evidence showing that fMRI can tackle this problem
any better than traditional ANS measures or the P300 (Peth et al.,
2015).
The DoD paradigm has been examined only in experiments
conducted under conditions that are substantially different from the
typical forensic situation. For example, in most DoD studies, par-
ticipants are asked to give deceptive answers to simple semantic
(e.g., “Is Rome the capital of Italy?”) or autobiographic questions
(e.g., “Is your name X?”). These items are markedly different from
relevant questions that may be presented in a criminal investigation
(e.g., “Did you murder Mr. X?”). For example, they differ in their
capacity to elicit emotional arousal and motivation to avoid detec-
tion. Importantly, research using the DoD with reaction times has
shown that lying becomes easier with practice (Hu et al., 2012;
Van Bockstaele et al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 2011). As it is likely
that, in real life, suspects are extensively repeating their lies, the
results of laboratory studies may not generalize to field
applications.
As outlined above, the DoD paradigm is the only paradigm that
attempts to isolate deceptive responding. Translating the findings
from DoD research to the field is, however, cumbersome for
another reason. Real-life deception typically contains an element of
choice. Yet, in DoD research, participants are instructed by the
experimenter to deceive, meaning that the essential choice compo-
nent is missing (see also Farah et al., 2014; Kanwisher, 2009; Sip
et al., 2007). Some DoD studies (e.g., Furedy, et al., 1994; Sip
et al., 2010; Spence et al., 2008) tried to overcome this difficulty
by giving participants a choice regarding the specific questions to
which they would give deceptive responses, although they had to
give deceptive responses to approximately half of the questions.
However, even under these artificial choice conditions, where par-
ticipants are instructed to deceive to some questions, deceptive
responses of experimental subjects are unlikely to match real
deceptive behavior in natural social interactions, where individuals
freely choose whether to lie or tell the truth.
Implications
We emphasized the distinction between paradigms designed to
shed light on the mechanisms underlying deception by isolating
deceptive behavior and those designed to diagnose guilt through
knowledge. Below, we will discuss the implications of this distinc-
tion for both basic research and applications.
Implications for Basic Research
As we argued above, the CQT and the CIT are ill-suited to study
the mechanisms that underlie deception. The CQT is unsuitable
because it lacks the basic requirement of proper controls, whereas
the CIT is ill-suited because deceptive responses are confounded
by frequency (i.e., deceptive responses occur on the minority of tri-
als) and memory effects (i.e., deceptive responses occur only to
information present in memory). The DoD paradigm, on the other
hand, was designed to examine deceptive behavior while control-
ling for confounding factors, but it is questionable whether the find-
ings translate to realistic situations mainly because one could argue
that participants follow instructions rather than actually respond
deceptively. A number of recent studies have already attempted to
resolve these issues by having participants choose whether to be
deceptive or not (e.g., Kozel et al., 2005; Sip et al., 2010, 2012),
but as of yet, construct validity (i.e., whether the construct of
deception is captured by this paradigm) of the DoD still remains
questionable.
Applied Implications
Because the CQT lacks proper controls, it is ill-suited to distinguish
between guilty and innocent suspects. The DoD procedure may be
adopted for this purpose, but currently there is no sufficient evi-
dence regarding the accuracy of discrimination between deceptive
and truthful subjects with this particular paradigm. The CIT, on the
other hand, is an effective paradigm to discriminate between people
with knowledge of intimate crime details and those without such
knowledge. As long as innocent suspects are unable to discriminate
between the relevant and the neutral items, they will not show a
differential pattern of behavioral or physiological responses to the
relevant items, irrespective of any potential confounding psycho-
logical mechanism unrelated to deception (e.g., being nervous).
Several recommendations for dealing with threats to the validity of
the CIT and for increasing its forensic application were made by
Ben-Shakhar (2012).
One of the factors that seem to hinder a large-scale application
of the CIT is its limited applicability (e.g., Krapohl, 2011; Podles-
ney, 1993, 2003). Whereas in the CQT and the DoD questions
about virtually any event can be formulated (e.g., “Did you shoot
X?” in the CQT or “I shot X” in the DoD), the CIT can only be
applied if sufficient details known exclusively to the offender are
present. This may be true for well-planned offences, but is less
likely to be the case in impulsively committed crimes. Importantly,
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employing the P300 or fMRI, rather than ANS measures, will not
resolve the limited applicability of the CIT due to insufficient probe
material.
A practical consideration is that both the CIT and the DoD para-
digms can be combined with easy and cost-effective measures such
as ANS parameters and reaction times. Table 2 demonstrates that,
in the CIT, the detection accuracy of fMRI is largely similar to that
obtained with ERPs (Meijer et al., 2014) and to accuracy rates
based on ANS measures. Thus, given that ANS, ERP, and reaction
time data can be obtained much more easily and cheaply than
fMRI data and that the former measures can be acquired in many
participants that cannot undergo fMRI testing (e.g., because of
claustrophobia or metallic implants), it is not to be expected that
fMRI would have practical utility as a field detection measure in
the near future.
Legal Implications
Because of its shortcomings outlined above, the CQT has no scien-
tific validity, and should not be admitted as evidence in court. Gal-
lai (1999) as well as Saxe and Ben-Shakhar (1999) discussed the
admissibility of the CQT in light of the four Daubert criteria (testa-
bility, or falsifiability), error rate, peer review and publication, and
general acceptance (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
1993, 113 S. Ct. Supp. 2786) and reached similar conclusions. Gal-
lai concluded that “the results of polygraph examinations as prac-
ticed today (i.e., the CQT) should not be admissible evidence in
federal courts” (Gallai, 1999, p. 88). In analyzing the four Daubert
criteria, Gallai (1999) demonstrated that the CQT does not satisfy
these criteria, with the possible exception of peer review and publi-
cations (but it should be noted that many of the publications related
to the CQT are critiques of the technique). Saxe and Ben-Shakhar
(1999) focused on the modern concept of scientific validity (e.g.,
Messick, 1995) and demonstrated that the CQT lacks several criti-
cal components of construct validity and discriminant validity.
Given that all these threats to the validity of the CQT are related to
weaknesses of the paradigm, they will not be resolved by using
fMRI rather than ANS measures in a CQT.
In contrast to the CQT, both the CIT and the DoD paradigm
have the potential of meeting the Daubert criteria, yet the crucial
component lacking is research on their accuracy in field situations.
Although the outcomes of the CIT can serve, under certain condi-
tions, as admissible evidence in judicial proceedings in Japan
(Nakayama, 2002), they do not meet one of the four Daubert crite-
ria because error rates in realistic situations remain unknown (Ben-
Shakhar & Kremnitzer, 2011; Rosenfeld, Hu, Labkovsky, Meixner,
& Winograd, 2013).
The Daubert criteria and related guidelines (Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichael, 1999, 1526 U.S. 137) allow for a relative
straightforward discussion of admissibility of scientific evidence.
In many other legal systems, admissibility may be less straightfor-
ward. A case in point here is a review about the admissibility of
emerging forensic neuroscience technologies in Canada (Frederik-
sen, 2011). This author attempts to answer the question whether
“brain fingerprinting” (i.e., the P300-based CIT) and fMRI lie
detection escape the prohibition imposed by jurisprudence regard-
ing the polygraph. Frederiksen concludes that “since the fMRI
technique claims to detect falsehood, it is likely inadmissible due
to its similarity to the polygraph: both claim to detect lies” (p.
127), and “While the current ban on the polygraph would apply to
any technique that is explicitly a lie detector, brain fingerprinting,
however, does not detect lying but instead the presence of memory.
This difference may allow it to bypass the broad prohibition on lie
detectors” (p. 115). As our review above has pointed out, however,
detecting memory of crime scene details can also be done with
fMRI or other measures. Frederiksen’s confusion of technique and
procedure highlights the importance of taking into account the par-
adigm for in-depth discussions about legal admissibility. Notewor-
thy here is also the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, United States v.
Scheffer (2003). In this case, the court decided that credibility
determinations is the jury’s task, rendering a CQT polygraph test
inadmissible (see also Wilson v. Corestaff Services. L.P., 2010). If
one were to follow this line of reasoning, the DoD would be inad-
missible as well because it detects deception, whereas the CIT
could be admissible as it detects concealed knowledge rather than
deception (Rosenfeld et al., 2013).
Methodologically sound field studies are essential to establish
accurate error rates. But what do such field studies look like?
Research has shown that prior information about the guilt of a sus-
pect—for example, about a confession—influences the outcomes
of subsequent forensic tests, including the outcomes of lie detection
tests (e.g., Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, Broers, & Merckelbach, 2014;
Elaad, Ginton, & Ben-Shakhar, 1994; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka,
2013). Given the large number of degrees of freedom, especially
when it comes to interpreting fMRI data, analysis of deception
detection results may be prone to biasing observer effects. Kassin
(2012) argues that these effects also occur in the other direction:
when suspects (falsely) confess, this confession taints the interpre-
tation and collection of subsequent evidence, in turn corroborating
the (false) confession. The literature on the observer biases sur-
rounding confessions then illustrates the importance of an inde-
pendent measure of ground truth: Even if the outcome of a test is
not used directly to elicit a confession, as is standard practice with
the forensic application of the CIT in Japan, dependence between
test outcome and ground truth may still be present (investigative
authorities may, for example, invest more resources in crime scene
analysis once a suspect failed a test). Ideally, to prevent such
dependence, the test should be conducted before any information
relevant to the ground truth has been collected, and the test out-
come should only be determined after the ground truth has been
established independently. Recently, Langleben and Moriarty
(2013) called for clinical trials of fMRI deception tools. Clinical tri-
als may be informative, but without a clear specification of the par-
adigm that will be employed, as well as a specification of how to
deal with the dependence of the test outcome and the ground truth,
such trials are destined to result in a discussion similar to that about
the accuracy of the CQT.
Finally, to illustrate the problems with internally and externally
valid studies, we would like to mention the study by Ginton, Daie,
Elaad, and Ben-Shakhar (1982). These authors administered an apti-
tude test to policemen, who were under the impression that failure to
perform well on this test would have severe consequences for their
career. Participants could cheat, but were unaware that this cheating
could be detected by the experimenters. As such, this study demon-
strated how an ideal study to examine the validity of lie detection
tests under realistic settings could be designed: individuals freely
chose whether to lie or not and ground truth criterion was available
independently of the test’s outcomes—and consequences were per-
ceived to be severe. However, under this realistic setup, most guilty
participants either refused to take the test or confessed before taking
the test and consequently the results could not yield any reliable con-
clusions. In addition, it is doubtful whether this type of study would
be approved by the current standards of ethics committees and insti-
tutional review boards (see also Rosenfeld et al., 2013).
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Conclusion
Great hopes and expectations were expressed regarding the poten-
tial use of brain imaging techniques for the detection of deception.
Contrary to what has been advocated by many researchers as well
as practitioners (e.g., Bles & Haynes, 2008; Farwell, 2012; Langle-
ben et al., 2005), the introduction of new measures such as P300
and fMRI is by no means a solution to the problems associated
with the ANS-based CQT polygraph test. The CQT has been
criticized for lacking proper controls and being unstandardized. In
addition, its outcome is often contaminated by prior information
available to the examiner. None of these criticisms can be resolved
by replacing ANS recordings with fMRI measures.
Moreover, all paradigms face a similar logical problem:
deception cannot be directly inferred either from the presence of
emotional arousal in the CQT or from attentional orienting or inhi-
bition in the CIT or DoD, regardless of whether ANS, reaction
times, ERPs, or fMRI measures have been used.
We discussed several methodological and conceptual shortcom-
ings associated with the paradigms designed to study deception and
detection of deception. Importantly, these shortcomings reflect the
research paradigms used, and not the dependent measures. New
paradigms may be able to overcome these shortcomings—at least
to some extent. However, to prevent superficial discussions driven
by the illusion of explanatory depth provided by fMRI scans
(Brown & Murphy, 2009; Rhodes, Rodriguez, & Shah, 2014), aca-
demic, legal, and ethical communities should consider the validity
of the paradigms, including the various threats to validity, rather
than focusing on the technology of the dependent measures.
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